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Foreword 
At the moment the Asian republics of the Soviet Union are a t  different stages of their 
demographic transition from "pre-modern" high fertility levels to "modern" low fertility 
while the Western parts of the Soviet Union are already past this transition and exhibit 
even sub-replacement fertility. Any population projection should take account of this a p  
parent heterogeneity. As compared to the conventional low-, medium-, and high-variant 
approach to population projection the scenario approach chosen in this paper has the ad- 
vantage that it can more directly point a t  the consequences of different assumptions on 
future paths in the individual republics of the Soviet Union. 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Deputy Leader 
Population Program 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In most countries of the world people call the Soviet Union Russia and its inhabi- 
tants Russians. This historically grown usage of the word Russian has long been incorrect 
but in the future it will even further lose its justification since soon less than half of the 
population of the Soviet Union will be living in the Russian Republic. When speaking 
about ethnicity this is even less the case because the Russian Republic also includes 
different ethnic groups. 
In this study we will not look a t  ethnicity but only a t  regional differentials as given 
by the structure of republics. Part  of the reason for this lies in the availability of data  on 
vital statistics which are readily available only for republics. But in a very crude sense 
relative changes in the population composition by republics also correspond to  changes in 
the composition according to  major ethnicities. 
The results of this study will impressively demonstrate the great regional variability 
of demographic patterns in the Soviet Union. As concerns fertility the Soviet Union in- 
cludes populations with sub-replacement fertility as low as in many highly industrialized 
countries and regions (such as Tadzhikistan) with fertility levels higher than in most 
developed countries. Hence attempts to treat the Soviet Union as an homogeneous aggre- 
gate and prepare population projections on this highly aggregate level1 have about the 
same value and justification as projecting the world population without differentiating by 
country or even continent. 
l ~ e c e n t l ~  Kingkade (1988) published scenarios for the population growth in the USSR to the year 2025 
which does not give any regional breakdown. 
This paper on the impact of regional demographic trends in the Soviet Union has 
two parts. First we study the trends in regional age-specific fertility rates since 1959 and 
assess by quantitative means the extent of family limitation and the current stage of the 
republic in the process of demographic transition. In a second part we define three 
different scenarios of future fertility and mortality trends for republics with the alterna- 
tives of continued diversity or convergence of fertility and mortality levels. Finally, the 
impact these alternative projections up to the year 2050 will have on the distribution of 
the Soviet population over republics and consequences such as differential patterns of po- 
pulation aging will be discussed. 
2. RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS BY REPUBLICS 
In 1987 the USSR population exceeded 281 million people (Vestnik statistiki, No. 5, 
1987). The national average crude birth rate was 19.4 per thousand and crude death rate 
10.6 per thousand in 1984-85, implying an annual natural increase of 8.8 per thousand. In 
1983, 72.6% of the total Soviet population lived in the European USSR and 27.4% lived in 
the Asian parts. 
More than half of the Soviet population lives currently in the Russian Republic but 
already less than half of all babies born in the Soviet Union are born in this large Repub- 
lic that  stretches from Leningrad to Vladiwostok. Certainly this will have implications 
on the future regional composition of the Soviet Union. Table 1 indicates the discrepan- 
cies between the share of the total living population and the share of all newborn. We see 
that  in 1970 the Russian Republic, Ukraine, and Belorussian had significantly lower pro- 
portions of all births than of the total populaticn. All other republics have higher propor- 
tions of births (most significantly Uzbekistan) or approximately equal proportions. 
In the 1970s birth rates declined in most of the high-fertility republics and in both 
urban and rural populations. Thus, in almost all the republics the rate of natural increase 
was lower in 1980 than in 1970. However, the differences between the growth rates in the 
highest and lowest-fertility republics increased even further to  a factor of 22 between 
growth rates of 0.13% and 2.9% in 1980 in Latvia and Tadzhikistan, respectively.2 Today, 
the Central Asian Republics, which contain one tenth of the total population, account for 
one third of the country's natural increase. 
2 ~ e e :  The USSR National Economy in 1980 (1980), Moscow, p. 32-33. 
Table 1. Proportions of the total population and of all births in the republics of the So- 
viet Union, 1970. 
Births Difference in 
Population Proportion Mean Proportion of Population 
Republic (in '000s) of USSR Age Absolute Proportion and Births 
RSFSR 130079.2 53.8 32.0 1900 45.0 -8.8 
UkrSSR 47126.5 19.5 33.6 719 17.0 -2.5 
BelS SR 9002.3 3.7 31.9 147 3.5 -0.2 
UsbSSR 11799.4 4.9 24.6 402 9.5 4.6 
KazSSR 13008.7 5.4 26.6 307 7.3 1.9 
GrSSR 4686.4 1.9 30.9 90 2.1 0.2 
h S S R  5117.1 2.1 24.9 151 3.6 1.5 
LitSSR 3128.2 1.3 32.9 56 1.3 0.0 
MolSSR 3568.9 1.5 29.5 70 1.7 0.2 
Lat SSR 2364.1 1 .O 35.8 34 0.8 -0.2 
KirSSR 2932.8 1.2 25.9 90 2.1 0.9 
TadSSR 2899.6 1.2 23.7 102 2.4 1.2 
ArmSSR 2491.9 1 .O 26.1 56 1.3 0.3 
TurkmSSR 2158.9 0.9 24.1 77 1.8 0.9 
EetSSR 1356.1 0.6 35.4 22 0.5 0.0 
USSR 241720.1 31.2 4225 
Table 2. Gross Reproduction Rates from 1970-1980 in the Soviet Republics. 
Republic 1970 1975 1980 
RSFSR 
UkrSSR 
BelSSR 
UzbSSR 
KazSSR 
GrSSR 
AzSSR 
LitSSR 
MolSSR 
LatSSR 
KirSSR 
TadSSR 
ArmSSR 
TurkmSSR 
EstSSR 
From this it becomes obvious that differential fertility will induce significant changes 
in the regional distribution of the Soviet Union. Hence, the the results of the scenarios 
conducted in this study will heavily depend on the kind of fertility assumptions made. In 
order to  evaluate the possible future paths of fertility in the republics of the Soviet Union 
a thorough study of fertility trends over the last decades is essential, especially when we 
believe that the process of demographic transition will continue and bring the fertility 
levels down substantially once it has started in a society. For this purpose we will focus in 
the following sections rather closely a t  recent trends in age specific fertility rates. From 
this we try to infer especially for the Asian republics a t  what point of the demographic 
transition they may be assumed to stand now, and what are likely paths for the future. 
Figure 1. Total fertility rates in selected Soviet republics, 1959-1986. 
Figure 1 depicts trends in the level of the total fertility rate between 1959 and 1985 
for the complete Soviet Union and for eight selected republics. In spite of very divergent 
paths of development in the republics, the aggregate fertility levels in the complete Soviet 
Union look very stable around a TFR of 2.3 to 2.6. The only features worth noting are a 
elight decline between 1959 and 1965 and a very weak increase after 1982. This recent 
increase might be explained in part by a change in weights toward the high-fertility 
republics, but it might also reflect some real change in behavior, for example due to the 
measures accepted in the USSR in 1981 to increase fertility. In the Asian republics the 
T F R  ranges between 4 and 6;  while in the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, Belorussia and in 
the Russian Republic, fertility now is around replacement level or even somewhat below. 
These regional differences are explained by social, ethnic and other peculiarities of 
different segments of the USSR population. 
Three Fertility Patterns 
With respect to  their trends over time, the Soviet republics might be classified into 
three categories: (1) the high natural fertility republics; (2) the middle, transitional- 
fertility republics; and (3) the low, controlled-fertility republics. 
Uzbekistan, Azerbayazhan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan fall into the first 
category. Tadzhikistan, a relatively small republic bordering Afghanistan with currently 
the highest level of fertility (a TFR of 5.7 in 1986), shows clearly increasing fertility levels 
between 1959 and 1976, and only a slight decline thereafter. As in many high-fertility 
countries the reason for such a marked fertility increase lies most probably in a decreasing 
incidence of sterility and a shortening of birth intervals owing to  changes in traditional 
behavior. The other three republics in this category show similar trends, with different 
turning points from increase to decline. In Azerbayazhan fertility increased until 1964 and 
then entered a steep and lasting decline. In Uzbekistan fertility levels peaked around 1970 
and declined thereafter. Turkmenistan, which is not shown on the graph, followed a line 
of development almost identical to  that  in Uzbekistan, only a t  a slightly lower level of fer- 
tility. 
The second group of republics includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia and 
shows steep fertility declines between 1959 and the late 1960s, followed by slower declines 
or even stability. These republics seem more advanced in their demographic transition 
than the republics in the first category, and we seem to  have caught the tail of the fertili- 
ty transition in the early 1960s. In Kazakhstan the pattern might be more complex be- 
cause of the great heterogeneity of the population consisting of high fertility Kazakhs and 
other ethnic groups with low fertility (about 50% of the population). 
The third, low-fertility category consists of republics that  have already passed 
through the secular fertility decline and show only some post-transitional fluctuations. In 
Estonia (shown in Figure I ) ,  which is one of the lowest-fertility republics in the Soviet 
Union, we note a relatively steep fertility increase between 1967 and 1971. We could 
speculate that  this was a phenomenon similar to  the baby boom in most Western coun- 
tries. The pattern in Latvia is similar to  that  in Estonia. Lithuania followed the same 
trend a t  a somewhat higher level of fertility. The very populous Ukraine showed a slight 
decline a t  an already low fertility level until 1965 and almost no change thereafter- 
similar to  the trend in the Russian Republic, which is by far the largest republic in terms 
of territory and people. 
Applying the paradigm of demographic transition to the fertility patterns in the S e  
viet republics observed between 1959 and 1986 and discussed above, we may interpret the 
different categories of republics as representing different phases of a transition process 
from natural to controlled fertility, with Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan the latest to follow 
this trend. 
We investigate this point further by looking a t  age-specific fertility rates in selected 
republics and by calculating the index of family limitation. 
Age-specific Fer t i l i ty  R a t e s  
Data on fertility were taken from two sources (Vishnevsky et al. 1988; Urlanis and 
Borisov 1984). Figure 2 gives the trends in age-specific fertility rates for Estonia. The 
trends are generally rather smooth. The greatest discontinuity was the almost 30% fertil- 
ity increase for women in the prime childbearing group, age 20-25, between 1967 and 
1972. After 1972 the rate remained stable a t  the new high level. Although we do not 
know the reason for this phenomenon, we may assume that  it had to  do with changes in 
marriages pattern because the fertility rate of women aged 15-20 also increased substan- 
tially; this increase, however, stretched out over a much longer period. In other groups 
the fertility increase was a short-term phenomenon visible also in the age groups 25-30 
and 30-35. Beyond age 30 fertility declined slowly over the whole period. This is a clear 
indication of a controlled-fertility regime. 
In Figure 3 we see the trends in age-specific fertility rates for Uzbekistan, a high- 
fertility republic. The fertility of women between ages 20 and 30 increased from 1959 to  
1976 and then slowly declined. For the next age group, 30-35, the increase lasted only 
until 1969. For women aged 35-40 the increase was less pronounced, but the decrease 
after 1970 was very strong. Women above age 40 show declining trends since the early 
1960s. 
What explains the fertility increase for younger women followed by a decline? We 
suggested above that the initial increase in already high-fertility republics was not due to  
an increase in desired family size, but due rather to an increase in the biological potential 
for childbearing. We may assume that  within a natural-fertility regime increases in aver- 
age fertility levels can be explained by changes in the proximate fertility determinants: 
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Figure 2. Age-specific fertility rates in Estonia, 1959-1985. 
Figure 3. Age-specific fertility rates in Uzbekistan, 1959-1985. 
fecundability, breastfeeding and the exposure to intercourse. It seems safe to  assume that  
increasing educational standards together with improvements in health care in the high- 
fertility republics resulted in lower sterility rates and higher monthly probabilities of con- 
ception. A reduction in the percentage of women breastfeeding, and in duration of 
breastfeeding, is another possible explanation for increased fertility levels. Fertility de- 
clines a t  higher ages, however, indicate the advent of fertility control, where women cons- 
ciously limit family size when they already have the number of children they want. 
Transition to Controlled Fertility 
The change from natural to  controlled fertility can best be illustrated by the change 
in the shape of age-specific fertility rates. If the curve is concave (to the origin) a t  higher 
ages, fertility is natural with older women still demonstrating relatively high fertility. If 
the curve is convex, this indicates controlled fertility because older women tend t o  have 
lower fertility in response to  higher numbers of children. This is true regardless of the 
level of fertility. 
Figure 4 gives age-specific fertility curves for Uzbekistan in 1959 and in 1985. In 
1959 the curve was clearly concave. In 1985 the level of fertility was still high, but the 
shape had already changed dramatically and clearly indicated controlled fertility. It had 
about the same shape as the controlled-fertility curves in Estonia, Belorussia, and the 
average of the whole Soviet Union in 1985. 
Coale and Trussell (1974) suggested a quantitative way to  assess the degree of fertil- 
ity control in a population. Among others, their model is designed to  estimate a parame- 
ter m of fertility control, which measures the degree of deviation from natural fertility. 
We have applied the Coale-Trussell model t o  overall age-specific fertility rates from 1959 
to  1986 (with the exception of a few years that were interpolated). This model was also 
used to convert empirical five-year age groups into one-year age groups. In almost all 
cases the fit was good. But for a few high-fertility republics we found that  observed fertili- 
ty rates in older age groups were higher than those estimated by the Coale-Trussell 
natural-fertility model. This might be a clue to  the existence of a somewhat different 
standard natural-fertility schedule in Soviet Asia. 
Kl 
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Figure 4. Age patterns of fertility in selected republics and years. 
The degree of deviation from natural fertility measured by m is given in Figure 5 for 
three selected republics and the Soviet Union as a whole. Values of m close to  0 imply na- 
tural fertility. The shift to  controlled fertility is gradual and takes place somewhere 
between m = 0.5 and m = 0.8. Thus, in Uzbekistan fertility proved to  be virtually uncon- 
trolled until the late 1970s. By 1985 Uzbekistan had reached a level of fertility control 
that is comparable to  the highly advanced republics in the late 1960s. Although this index 
gives only a crude indication of a fertility regime, we clearly eee the structural change for 
Uzbekistan and the further trend toward higher control in the European republics and the 
Soviet Union as a whole. 
Figure 5. Index of family limitation m in selected republics, 1959-1985. 
Mortality 
Mortality-the other important factor of population changewi l l  be treated less ex- 
tensively in this paper, partly because we do not believe that mortality variations will 
play an important role in determinating future differentials between the population size of 
republics and secondly because published data on mortality are more fragmentary than on 
fertility and hence do not allow the analysis of time series of age specific rates. 
Table 3 indicates that in 1970 life expectancy was highest in Armenia (72.9) and 
Belorussia (72.4) and lowest in Turkmenistan (68.4) and the Russian Republic (68.8). 
Generally, it is amazing to see how low the mortality differentials are as compared to the 
fertility differentials described above. The difference between maximum and minimum is 
only 4.5 years or 6% of the Armenian life expectancy. 
Table 3. Life expectancies a t  birth, 1970-1985 by republic. 
Republic 1970 1980 1985 
RSFSR 68.8 67.5 69.3 
UkrSSR 70.9 69.7 70.5 
BelSSR 72.4 71.1 71.4 
UzbSSR 71.8 67.6 68.2 
KazSSR 70.1 67.0 68.9 
GrSSR 71.9 71.2 71.6 
AzSSR 69.2 68.1 69.9 
LitSSR 71.1 70.5 71.5 
MolSSR 69.1 65.6 66.4 
LatSSR 70.2 68.9 70.2 
KirSSR 67.9 66.0 67.9 
TadSSR 69.9 66.3 69.7 
ArmSSR 72.9 72.8 73.3 
TurkmSSR 68.4 64.6 64.8 
EstSSR 70.4 69.4 70.4 
In 1980 published life expectancies are lower in each republic. Although the reasons 
for this partly significant increase in mortality in all republics over the 1970s remain un- 
clear it seems to be the case that  recently mortality conditions improved again. The 
figures published for 1985 show again significantly higher life expectancies than in 1980 
and are in many cases higher than those reported for 1970. Again, Armenia is at  the top 
of the list with a life expectancy of 73.3 years. The variation, however, seems to  be higher 
in 1985 than it was in 1970. 
For migration we will not make specific assumptions and only assume that  the inten- 
sities remain as observed in 1970. For this reason there is also no need of discussion recent 
trends in migration here. 
3. SETTING SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 
The scenario approach to population projection does not attempt to  produce one 
most probable variant or possibly other less probable variants which result from rather 
complex sets of assumptions that  are mostly not explicit. In contrast to the usual vari- 
ants the scenario approach makes explicit relatively simple alternative assumptions. The 
purpose of this exercise is to  compare results coming from different sets of assumptions 
and assess the impact of alternative future trends. In a way this is closer to  sensitivity 
analysis of assumptions in population projection than to  the prediction of future popula- 
tion sizes. 
Following this logic we also do not want to  specify complex assumptions of changing 
patterns of age-specific fertility and mortality but instead define three very simple 
scenarios. Rather than assuming future fertility and mortality trends for each republic 
separately we will define the scenarios according to two alternative principles concerning 
the differences between republics: convergence or continued diversity in fertility and mor- 
tality. Hence the following scenarios may be defined: 
S C E N A R I O  A :  Continued diversi ty;  fertility and mortality remain a t  the level o b  
served in 1985 
S C E N A R I O  B: Cont inued diversi ty in  fertility; convergence in mortality; fertility 
rates remain as in 1985, life expectancy increases gradually to 75.0 years in all republics 
by 2020, and remains constant thereafter. 
S C E N A R I O  C: Convergence i n  fertility and mortali ty;  life expectancy increases gra- 
dually to  75.0 years and fertility goes t o  replacement level in all republics by the year 
2020, both remain constant thereafter. 
These three scenarios with the only alternatives of convergence and continued diver- 
gence seem t o  be much less specific than it could be made on the basis of the analysis of 
past fertility trends above. It was felt, however, that  it would serve the comparative pur- 
pose better to  give these rather general alternative scenarios, rather than construct possi- 
ble further trends in the continuation of the demographic transition based on the current 
status of the development in each republic. Even for some of the Asian republics where 
the progress in the fertility transition seems to be rather clear, the timing of the future 
fertility decline could have been only speculation. Even more so, in the very low fertility 
republics of Europe assumptions on the future course of fertility levels would have been 
pure guessing. The assumption of a population reaching replacement fertility a t  some 
point in the future is not very original and there is no substantive reason why the replace- 
ment level should be more probable than any other low fertility level. For our cornpara- 
tive analysis of future scenarios, however, such a simple assumption seems to serve its 
purpose as a point of reference for comparisons. 
COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
The population projections were performed by using Dialog (Scherbov and 
Grechucha 1988)-the system that  allows the analyst to  quickly obtain and visualize the 
consequences of alternative assumptions about future developments in demographic 
processes. 
Selected results of the three alternative population projections according to  the 
scenario assumptions specified above will be presented below in tabular and graphical 
form. Table 4 shows the impact of the assumed alternative demographic trends in the 
republics on the total population size and mean age of the complete Soviet Union. Tables 
5 to  7 give the changes in the relative size of the republic within the total Soviet popula- 
tion of the specified age groups for the three different scenarios. Figures 6a-c will indicate 
the changes in the proportions of newborn and Figures 7a-c trends in the mean age of the 
population for selected republics according to  the three alternative projections. Figures 8 
and 9 finally give 3-D views of the changing age structure over time of two major repub- 
lics, Uzbekistan and the Russian Republic. 
Table 4 shows that  in terms of total population size and mean age the scenarios 
result in very different patterns by the middle of the next century. While the assumption 
of a continuation of current fertility and mortality levels (scenario A) will result in a 
population that  is by far the youngest of the three scenarios, the projected population size 
will be between those of scenarios B and C. It is obvious that  the assumption of contin- 
ued present fertility levels together with an increase in life expectancy (scenario B) will 
result in a somewhat older population age structure (because the mortality improvement 
will mostly affect people above the mean age of the population) and because of lower 
death rates a t  constant fertility rates also in a larger population size. According to  
scenario B the Soviet population would increase by more than 70% between 1970 and 
2050 to  418 million. 
An assumed convergence of the fertility levels in all republics towards replacement 
by the year 2020 together with convergent and somewhat increasing life expectancies 
results in a rapid aging of the Soviet population. While the total population size would 
stabilize around 350 million after 2035, the mean age of the population would increase 
very rapidly to about 40 years by the middle of the next century. This would mean an 
extremely high degree of aging even by the standards of currently rapidly aging societies 
in Western Europe. 
Table 4. Resulting total population sizes (in millions) and mean ages for the total Soviet 
Union under scenarios A, B, and C. 
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Year Total Mean age Total Mean age Total Mean age 
1970 242 31.2 
1975 253 32.3 
1980 264 33.1 
1985 275 33.6 
Table 5. Shares of the individual republics on the total Soviet population and on certain 
age groups in the total Soviet Union according to Scenario A. 
Total 0-19 yeara 2 W  yeara 60+ yeare 
Republic 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 
RSFSR .530 .429 -.lo1 .472 .331 1 4  .554 A48 -.I06 .558 .518 -.040 
UkrSSR .I88 .I45 - 0 4  .I67 .I15 -.051 .1W .l49 -.040 .225 .I72 -.053 
BelSSR .037 .030 -.007 .035 .024 -.011 .037 .030 -.007 .038 .035 -.003 
UsbSSR .055 .I34 .080 .087 207 .I20 .043 .I21 .078 .OM .069 .035 
KasSSR .057 .071 .013 .072 .078 .006 .055 .070 .015 .039 .062 .023 
GrSSR .019 .013 -.ME .020 ,011 -.009 .018 .012 -.ME .019 .016 -.003 
AS SSR .023 .OM .011 .033 .O41 .008 .020 .033 .013 .013 .026 .013 
LitSSR .013 .010 -.003 .012 .008 -.004 .013 .010 -.003 .Ol4 .012 -.002 
MolSSR .015 .013 -.002 .016 .012 -.004 .015 .013 -.002 .013 .012 -.001 
LatSSR .009 .008 -.001 .008 .006 -.002 .010 .008 -.&I1 .012 .009 -.003 
KirSSR .013 .022 .009 .019 .030 .011 .011 .020 .009 .009 .015 .006 
TadSSR .Ol4 .M5 .031 .023 .075 .053 .011 .039 .028 .007 .019 .012 
h S S R  -011 -013 -002 .Ol4 .012 -.002 .011 .013 .002 .006 .015 .009 
TurkmSSR .010 .026 .016 .016 .MI .025 .008 .024 .016 .006 .012 .006 
EstSSR .006 .006 .001 .005 .005 .000 .006 .007 .001 .007 .007 -.00O 
USSR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Table 6. Shares of the individual republics on the total Soviet population and on certain 
age groups in the total Soviet Union according to  Scenario B. 
Total 0-19 years 20-60 year8 60+ yeare 
Republic 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 
RSFSR 
UkrSSR 
BelSSR 
UsbSSR 
KarSSR 
GrSSR 
AXSSR 
LitSSR 
MolSSR 
Lat SSR 
KirSSR 
TadSSR 
ArmSSR 
TurkmSSR 
EstSSR .006 .006 .001 .005 .005 .000 .006 .007 .001 .007 .007 -.000 
Table 7. Shares of the individual republics on the total Soviet population and on certain 
age groups in the total Soviet Union according t o  Scenario C. 
Total 0-19 yeare 20-60 year8 60+ years 
Republic 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 1980 2050 Dif. 
RSFSR .530 .515 -.015 .472 .511 .039 .554 .514 -.040 .558 .526 -.032 
UkrSSR .I88 .I72 -.016 .I67 .I74 .007 .I90 .I72 -.016 .225 .I69 -.055 
BelSSR .037 .034 -.003 .035 .035 -.001 .037 .035 -.003 .038 .034 -.005 
UsbSSR .055 .071 .016 .087 .073 -.014 .043 .071 .027 .034 .067 .033 
KasSSR .057 .062 .005 .072 .062 -.010 .055 .061 .007 .039 .062 .023 
GrSSR .019 .014 -.005 .020 .013 -.OM .018 .013 -.005 .019 .015 -.004 
AsSSR .023 .026 .003 .033 .027 -.007 .020 .026 .006 .013 .025 .012 
LitSSR .013 .012 -.001 .012 .012 -.OW .013 .012 -.001 .014 .012 -.002 
MolSSR .015 .014 -.001 .016 .014 -.002 .015 .014 -.001 .013 .014 .001 
LatSSR .009 .010 .000 .008 .010 .002 .010 .010 .000 .012 .009 -.003 
KirSSR .013 .015 .001 .019 .015 -.005 .011 .014 .003 .009 .015 .006 
TadSSR .014 .020 .006 .023 .021 -.002 .011 .020 .009 .007 .018 .011 
AmSSR .011 .013 .002 .014 .013 -.001 .011 .013 .002 .006 .013 .007 
TurkmSSR .010 .014 .004 .016 .014 -.002 .008 .014 .006 .0016 .013 .007 
EstSSR .006 .007 .002 .005 .007 .003 .OM .008 .002 .007 .007 -.OOO 
From the figures and tables referring to  the individual republics and comparing the 
changes in their relative sizes, it becomes apparent that the differences between scenario 
A and B are much less than their difference from scenario C. This indicates that  the as- 
sumption made on fertility trends have greater impact on the future population composi- 
tion than those made on life expectancy. 
Assuming constant fertility and mortality rates (scenario A) will result in very 
dramatic changes in the population structure of the Soviet Union. The Russian Republic 
that  currently has more than half of the Soviet population would increase in absolute 
terms from 140 Million to  183 Million by 2050 but in relative terms i t  would shrink by 
more than 10 percentage points to  slightly above 40 percent of the total Soviet popula- 
tion. In sharp contrast to this Uzbekistan would almost double its population size and in- 
crease its share of the total Soviet population from 5% to 13%. Tadzhikistan and Turk- 
menistan will also grow at  a similar speed under assumed constancy of present fertility 
and mortality rates. On the loosing side are aside from Russia, Ukrainia, Belorussia, and 
Georgia. The Baltic Republics would grow at  about the same speed as the total Soviet 
Union and therefore hold their relative position. 
For the young age group (0-19) these changes under assumed constancy of rates 
would be even more pronounced. In 2050 only 33% of the young people would live in Rus- 
sia whereas more than 20% would live in Uzbekistan, and 8% in Kazakhstan and Tad- 
zhikistan each. The same pattern is apparent in the graph of the relative distribution of 
newborns by republic (Figure 7a). For the older age groups the changes go into the same 
direction but are less pronounced than for the total or for the younger age groups. This is 
not only due to the fact that those people belong to the still smaller cohorts already born 
or to be born in the next years, but is also due to assumed persistence in mortality 
differentials that indicate somewhat lower life expectancies in the Asian parts 
Another scenario that assumes constant fertility levels for each republic but an con- 
vergence in mortality towards a life expectancy of 75 in all republics (scenario B) results 
in essentially the same pattern as described above for scenario A. One difference between 
the results from the two scenarios is that the loss in the relative size of the European 
republics will be even higher for republics that already now have high life expectancies. 
The Russian Republic with currently relatively adverse mortality conditions would hence 
profit from the assumed increase in life expectancy more than e.g. Ukraine and Belorussia 
and would show a faster increase of its population than under scenario A. Because some 
mortality improvement is assumed in every republic, each of them will grow faster than 
under scenario A and the total population of the Soviet Union in 2050 would be 418 Mil- 
lion instead of the 389 Million under scenario A, as discussed above. 
The assumptions of convergence in mortality and fertility (scenario C), finally, will 
have a very great impact on the population structure. All republics would grow substan- 
tially, even those who have currently sub-replacement fertility such as Russia and the 
Ukraine. But for the currently high fertility republics the growth would be much less than 
under the previous two scenarios. As a consequence of the above stated trends a conver- 
gence in fertility towards replacement level in all republics would lead to much less 
significant changes in the share of individual republics in the total Soviet population. 
Figures 8 and 9, finally, give 3-D presentations of possible changes of the age struc- 
ture under the assumptions of scenarios A and C for two selected republics, Russia and 
Uzbekistan. Since in the Russian Republic fertility is already below replacement level, 
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Figure 6. Proportions of all births in the USSR by republics 1970-2050 under scenarios 
A, B, and C. 
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Figure 7. Trends in mean ages of the population 1970-2050 for the USSR and selected 
republics under the assumptions of scenarios A, B, and C. 
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Figure 8. 3-D presentation of the population age structure in Russian Republic 
1970-2050 as projected under scenarios A and C. 
now the future trends will go towards a rectangularization of the age structure in both 
cases. Under scenario C the assumed increases in life expectancy result in a clearly 
greater number of people above age 60 under scenario A. Especially the cohorts of the 
Russian baby boom in the 1960s would profit greatly from the mortality improvement. 
Hence the ridge crossing the figures diagonally is much stronger towards the older end 
under scenario C than under C. 
For Uzbekistan the difference between the two scenarios is much more dramatic. 
Under assumed constant fertility and mortality rates the population would explode and 
show the typical pattern of a very high fertility country. Under an assumed trend t e  
wards replacement level by 2020, however, the largest cohorts would be born towards the 
end of the century followed by a steep decline in births. In the very left corner we can 
then even see the weak echo of these larger birth cohorts. If fertility should enter such a 
steep decline in Uzbekistan as it already did in Armenia and later on in Azerbayazhan, 
the future population structure would by the middle of the next century become similar 
to today's age structure in the European parts of the CSSR. 
Concluding Remarks 
All scenarios defined in this study indicate that the Soviet Union currently is ex- 
periencing a significant restructuring (Perestroika) also in demographic terms and that 
these trends will continue even stronger over the next decades. In case of a convergence 
of the fertility trends of all republics the change in the population structure would be less 
than in the case of a continuation of current diversity. 
For demographers changes in the Asia republics can give a very interesting lesson on 
demographic transition that has not been studied much so far. 
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Figure 9.  3-D presentation of the population age structure in Uzbekistan 1970-2050 as 
projected under scenarios A and C. 
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